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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
MANSMANN, Circuit Judge. 
 
Leonard G. Tillman is a former prisoner who was 
assessed a fee of $10.00 per day for housing costs 
stemming from two periods of incarceration in a county 
facility for state parole violations. When Tillman was 
confined for the second term, officials confiscated half of 
the funds in his wallet and half of all funds sent on his 
behalf, in order to pay for the assessments. Tillman 
ultimately accumulated a debt exceeding $4,000.00, for 
which his account was turned over to a collection agency 
after his release from prison. 
 
In a pro se complaint filed against the prison and its 
warden, Tillman alleged that the levying and collection of 
these sums violated 42 U.S.C. S 1983. The defendants 
moved for dismissal, or in the alternative, for summary 
judgment, but the Magistrate Judge recommended denial of 
the motion on the basis of an analysis of the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. After the defendants filed 
supplemental affidavits, the District Court granted 
summary judgment and dismissed the complaint. We will 
affirm. 
 
I. Facts 
 
The underlying facts are, as Tillman concedes, 
"essentially undisputed." After committing unspecified 
parole violations, Tillman was incarcerated in the Lebanon 
County Correctional Facility in Pennsylvania between 
January 30, 1997 and August 21, 1997. Parole was again 
granted, but similar violations led to his recommitment to 
the same facility on October 24, 1997. 
 
Upon recommitment, prison authorities confiscated half 
of the money in Tillman's wallet and subsequently took half 
of all funds sent on his behalf. These actions were taken 
pursuant to the facility's Cost Recovery Program. Under 
this program, prisoners are assessed a daily charge of 
$10.00 towards their housing expenses. Any money 
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generated through the program goes into the county's 
general fund, which pays the facility's operating costs. 
 
Significantly, the availability of prison services is not 
contingent upon keeping a clean account. Failure to pay 
does not result in the denial of room, board, clothing, or 
other services. Neither can it result in extended prison time 
or reincarceration. 
 
Instead, when a prisoner lacks sufficient funds to pay the 
assessments, a negative account balance is created. 
Authorities may then take half of any funds, from any 
source, sent to a prisoner in order to satisfy the negative 
balance. Any remainder is credited to the prisoner's inmate 
account for his or her personal use. 
 
If there is still an outstanding negative balance upon a 
prisoner's release from jail, any funds remaining in his or 
her inmate account are put towards the debt. If any debt 
still remains unpaid upon release, the ex-prisoner remains 
responsible for the debt as a civil liability. The prison 
attempts to work out a payment plan, but if the debt 
remains unpaid after release, the account may be turned 
over to a collection agency. Warden Robert L. Raiger notes 
in an affidavit, however, that an account will not be turned 
over for collection if the ex-prisoner maintains a minimal 
payment such as $5.00 per week. The outstanding balance 
is also kept on the prison's records, so if the ex-prisoner is 
later reincarcerated, the prior debt remains in full force 
while new debt begins to accumulate. 
 
Because Tillman had not paid off the assessments from 
his previous term of incarceration, he had an outstanding 
balance upon recommitment. Consequently, as noted, 
authorities confiscated half the money in his possession 
and took half of all funds sent on his behalf to satisfy the 
debt. The confiscated funds still did not satisfy the 
assessments, however, leaving the plaintiff with a debt of 
over $4,000.00 after his final discharge in July of 1998. His 
account was ultimately turned over to a collection agency. 
 
Not all prisoners fall within the Cost Recovery Program. 
"Trusty" inmates, who perform work assignments that are 
essential to the day-to-day operation of the prison, are 
excused from the program. Also excused are prisoners 
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participating in the Work Release Program because they are 
already required to pay a minimum of $70.00 per week 
towards their room and board. 
 
Authorities mistakenly failed to assess the fees against 
one inmate, Anthony Ashford, who had previously been 
exempt as a work release prisoner. After Ashford was 
removed from the Work Release Program, authorities 
neglected to begin charges under the Cost Recovery 
Program. Upon receiving notice via the plaintiff 's 
complaint, however, they back-charged Ashford's account. 
 
The Cost Recovery Program had been put into effect prior 
to both terms of the plaintiff 's parole violation 
incarceration. It was adopted by the Lebanon County 
Prison Board on June 19, 1996, and effective July 1 of that 
year. At that time, a memorandum regarding the program 
and a copy of the program itself were posted throughout the 
prison. When Tillman was incarcerated in January of 1997, 
these notices were still posted in all cell blocks, including 
the one to which he had access. 
 
At that time, Tillman was also given an inmate handbook 
detailing the prison's grievance program, which allowed 
prisoners to "state any grievance concerning any matter 
you feel is unjust . . . ." In June of 1997, during the 
plaintiff 's initial term of parole violation incarceration, the 
handbook was updated to include a description of the Cost 
Recovery Program, as well as an expanded grievance 
program that allowed for direct appeal to the warden. The 
plaintiff was given a copy of the updated handbook, and 
upon recommitment in October of 1997, was again provided 
with a copy. 
 
Although prisoners were assessed $10.00 per day 
through the Cost Recovery Program, the actual cost of the 
plaintiff 's room and board amounted to $32.00 per day. 
Incarcerated in a county facility, however, the plaintiff here 
was a state prisoner. Although the plaintiff 's pro se 
complaint alleged that the state reimbursed the county 
prison for his costs of incarceration, an affidavit filed by 
Lebanon County Commissioner William G. Carpenter states 
that no such repayment is given to the county facility for 
prisoners who are committed for state parole violations. 
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While still incarcerated,1 the plaintiff filed a pro se 
complaint in the United States District Court for the Middle 
District of Pennsylvania on July 22, 1998. He named as 
defendants Warden Raiger and the Lebanon County 
Correctional Facility. In the complaint, the plaintiff charged 
violations of 42 U.S.C. S 1983 arising from the daily 
assessments, which were imposed despite the alleged fact 
that the "[s]tate pays county" for his expenses. He further 
claimed that the prison took half the money in his wallet 
and half of the money orders "sent in to help me live 
better." He complained that "some" inmates were not 
charged and that prisoner Anthony Ashford was neither 
charged nor had any money taken from him. Tillman also 
made cursory references to assessments for medical 
treatment and to "false incarceration." 
 
After the plaintiff was granted permission to proceed in 
forma pauperis, the defendants moved for dismissal under 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), or in the alternative, for summary 
judgment under Rule 56(c). Counsel subsequently entered 
an appearance on the plaintiff 's behalf andfiled a 
response. 
 
A Magistrate Judge treated the defendants' motion as one 
for summary judgment and in a memorandum opinionfiled 
April 9, 1999, recommended that the motion be denied. 
Although Tillman did not specify any particular legal theory 
or authority in his response, the Magistrate Judge engaged 
in a detailed analysis of the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. First, held the Magistrate Judge, although 
prisoners could avoid medical fees by declining to seek 
treatment, they could not avoid residing in an institution. 
That fact and the amount of debt created a triable question 
of fact regarding cruel and unusual punishment. Second, it 
could not be shown as a matter of law that the fees were 
not excessive fines in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 
Third, the defendants failed to demonstrate what due 
process, if any, was provided to the plaintiff. Finally, the 
Court held that it lacked sufficient information to conclude 
that there was no material question of fact regarding any 
equal protection claim. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The plaintiff was subsequently released on July 25, 1998 because of 
the expiration of the maximum underlying sentence. 
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The defendants objected to the Magistrate Judge's report 
and filed supplemental affidavits from Warden Raiger and 
Commissioner Carpenter. They detailed the notice given to 
prisoners, the availability of grievance procedures, and 
asserted that the prison was not reimbursed by the state 
for maintenance expenses. The defendants provided copies 
of relevant sections from the superceded and updated 
prisoner handbooks. They also stated that the Cost 
Recovery Program was not intended to punish, but rather 
to rehabilitate by teaching inmates financial responsibility 
by sharing in the costs of their food, housing, clothes, and 
protection. 
 
The District Court granted summary judgment to the 
defendants and dismissed the plaintiff 's complaint in an 
opinion filed on August 2, 1999. Due in part to the 
additional evidence, the District Court took a very different 
approach to the case. First, as to the claim of cruel and 
unusual punishment, the Court found dispositive our 
opinion in Reynolds v. Wagner, 128 F.3d 166 (3d Cir. 
1997), where we held that charging prisoners fees for 
medical treatment was not prohibited by the Constitution, 
so long as they were provided with care even when they 
could not afford to pay the fees. 
 
As in Reynolds, held the District Court, Tillman was 
never denied any basic human need. That a prisoner might 
leave jail with a debt was irrelevant. Disagreeing with the 
Magistrate Judge, the District Court also found it legally 
immaterial that a prisoner could forgo medicine but could 
not decline housing services. 
 
Second, the Court rejected the "excessive fines" 
argument. Although the District Court doubted that the 
fees amounted to a "fine," it concluded that even if they 
were fines, they were not excessive because the costs of 
incarceration by definition cannot be disproportionate to 
the offense. Third, the due process claim was rejected 
because the notice given and postdeprivation remedy 
available through the grievance procedure were 
constitutionally adequate. Finally, the Court held that equal 
protection was not violated because trusty and work release 
inmates were taught financial responsibility, respectively, 
by being provided with labor opportunities and by being 
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required to make payments of at least $70.00 per week. The 
District Court therefore dismissed the case in its entirety. 
Tillman timely appealed. 
 
The District Court properly exercised jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. SS 1331, 1343(a)(3). Our jurisdiction is premised 
on 28 U.S.C. S 1291. We exercise plenary review, accepting 
the non-movant's allegations as true, and drawing 
inferences in the light most favorable to him. Meritcare Inc. 
v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 166 F.3d 214, 223 (3d Cir. 
1999). The grant of summary judgment must be affirmed if 
"there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . 
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
 
II. Discussion 
 
We initially note that a number of states authorize 
charges against a prisoner's wages or inmate account.2 
Courts have consistently found that there is no 
constitutional impediment to deducting the cost of room 
and board from a prisoner's wages.3 In one case similar to 
the dispute before us, a state supreme court upheld daily 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Some statutes allow for deductions from a prisoner's wages. See, e.g., 
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. S 41-1622, stat. note; Iowa Code Ann. S 904.701(2); 
Minn. Stat. Ann. S 243.23(2); Mo. Ann. Stat.S 217.435(2); Neb. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. S 83-184(b)(3). Other statutes provide for general authority to 
recover the cost of incarceration. See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. S 12-29-501 
et seq.; Fla. Stat. Ann. S 960.293(2); Iowa Code Ann. S 356.7(1); Mich. 
Comp. Laws Ann. S 800.404(8); Minn. Stat. Ann.S 243.23(3). 
 
3. See, e.g., Christiansen v. Clarke, 147 F.3d 655, 657 (8th Cir. 1998); 
Mastrian v. Schoen, 725 F.2d 1164, 1166 (8th Cir. 1984); Iowa v. Love, 
589 N.W.2d 49, 52 (Iowa 1998); Cumbey v. Oklahoma, 699 P.2d 1094, 
1097 (Okla. 1985). Other courts have decided non-constitutional 
disputes arising under such statutes without noting any constitutional 
impediment to the statutes' application. See, e.g., Ford v. Arizona, 979 
P.2d 10, 11, 13 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999); Iowa v. Jackson, 601 N.W.2d 354, 
356-57 (Iowa 1999); State Treasurer v. Gardner , 583 N.W.2d 687, 690 
(Mich. 1998); cf. Auge v. New Jersey Dep't of Corrections, ___ A.2d ___, 
No. A-3472-98T1, 2000 WL 17309, *6 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 3, 
2000) (ten percent surcharge on prisoner purchases would be acceptable 
on alternative ground of defraying "substantial costs" of food, clothing, 
medical care, and other necessities). 
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assessments of $50.00 that became, in effect, civil 
judgments against the prisoners. Ilkanic v. City of Fort 
Lauderdale, 705 So. 2d 1371, 1372-73 (Fla. 1998). Federal 
law acknowledges that a prisoner's wages might be subject 
to deductions for room and board. 18 U.S.C. S 1761(c)(2)(B). 
In addition, we have noted in dictum that "sparing the 
taxpayers the cost of imprisonment would likely be a 
constitutionally permissible governmental purpose." United 
States v. Spiropoulos, 976 F.2d 155, 168 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 
In reviewing prison regulations, we ask whether the 
regulation is reasonably related to a legitimate penological 
interest. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).4 We share 
the Magistrate Judge's skepticism over whether the Turner 
standard is applicable to the Cost Recovery Program, which 
by its own title might be more properly understood as a 
transfer of funds than a way to regulate prison behavior. 
We need not determine whether Turner is controlling 
because in either case, no constitutional violation has 
occurred. 
 
The complaint charged a violation of 42 U.S.C. S 1983 
from the alleged "swindling [of] state prisoner[s]" under the 
Cost Recovery Program.5 The parties now focus on the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Under Turner, we look to: 
 
       (1) the rational relationship between the regulati on and the 
       governmental interest put forward to justify it; 
 
       (2) the existence of alternative means to exercise  the asserted 
right; 
 
       (3) the impact on prison resources of accommodatin g the asserted 
       right; and 
 
       (4) the existence of "ready alternatives" to  accommodate the 
       asserted right at "de minimis" cost to valid penological interests 
 
Reynolds v. Wagner, 128 F.3d 166, 172 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 
5. The pro se complaint further alleges that the plaintiff was subjected 
to 
false incarceration and that he was charged fees to see a doctor. The 
plaintiff notes that he has a separate pending action regarding any claim 
that he was held prisoner beyond his legal sentence. That claim is 
therefore not before us. 
 
On appeal, the plaintiff -- apparently in the context of discussing the 
room and board fees -- makes a number of somewhat jumbled factual 
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Cruel and Unusual Punishments and Excessive Fines 
Clauses of the Eighth Amendment, and the Due Process 
and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth 
 
Amendment. We will address these provisions in turn. 6 
 
A. Eighth Amendment 
 
1. Cruel and Unusual Punishments 
 
The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the 
Eighth Amendment7 proscribes"punishments which are 
incompatible with the evolving standards of decency that 
mark the progress of a maturing society." Estelle v. Gamble, 
429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (internal quotes omitted). 
Prohibited are punishments that "involve the unnecessary 
and wanton infliction of pain, or are grossly 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
allegations about medical care in the argument portion of his brief. He 
admits that no such facts were put before the District Court due to the 
"flaccidity" of counsel's brief. Opening Br. at 9. Further, counsel does 
not 
assert that these facts are specific to the plaintiff 's situation, 
instead 
appearing to relate to general matters that "[c]ounsel is told." Id. 
 
The defendants properly complain that we should not consider these 
facts, which are of dubious relevance to this appeal in any case. 
Although we normally hold pro se complaints to a "less stringent" 
standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, Micklus v. Carlson, 
632 F.2d 227, 236 (3d Cir. 1980), the plaintiff here has been represented 
by counsel since the defendants filed their dispositive motions. The 
plaintiff has not filed any affidavits, has not put forth cognizable 
argument, and in this context, does not cite to relevant authority. The 
plaintiff 's "passing reference in a brief will not suffice to bring that 
issue 
before this court." Simmons v. City of Philadelphia, 947 F.2d 1042, 1066 
(3d Cir. 1991). 
 
6. Although the pro se complaint did not identify any particular theory of 
recovery, the Magistrate Judge gave it a generous reading and focused 
his analysis on the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The plaintiff, 
through counsel, now points to those provisions in his statement of the 
issues presented for review. Although we address those issues, we 
decline to consider whether any other legal theory might provide for 
recovery. 
 
7. The Eighth Amendment states in full: "Excessive bail shall not be 
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual 
punishments inflicted." 
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disproportionate to the severity of the crime." Rhodes v. 
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981) (citations and internal 
quotes omitted). 
 
Prison conditions may amount to cruel and unusual 
punishment if they cause "unquestioned and serious 
deprivations of basic human needs . . . . [that] deprive 
inmates of the minimal civilized measure of life's 
necessities." Id. at 347. Accordingly, when the government 
takes a person into custody against his or her will, it 
assumes responsibility for satisfying basic human needs 
such as food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and 
reasonable safety. DeShaney v. Winnebago Co. Dep't of 
Social Svcs., 489 U.S. 189, 199-200 (1989). 
 
To demonstrate a deprivation of his basic human needs, 
a plaintiff must show a sufficiently serious objective 
deprivation, and that a prison official subjectively acted 
with a sufficiently culpable state of mind, i.e., deliberate 
indifference. Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 67 (3d Cir. 1996) 
(citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991)). 
 
In City of Revere v. Massachusetts General Hospital, 463 
U.S. 239 (1983), a hospital sued a city for the cost of 
treating a person shot by a police officer. The Court held 
that although the city was responsible for ensuring that 
medical care was provided, the Constitution did not dictate 
the allocation of costs between the city and the hospital. Id. 
at 245. In so holding, the Court noted that "[n]othing we 
say here affects any right a hospital or governmental entity 
may have to recover from a detainee the cost of the medical 
services provided to him." Id. at 245 n.7. The Court thus 
hinted that so long as treatment was provided, the cost of 
the services might be recovered from the detainee who 
received the benefit of the medical treatment. 
 
We made a similar assumption in Monmouth County 
Correctional Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326 
(3d Cir. 1987), where female prisoners were required to 
obtain their own financing to obtain elective abortions. 
Looking to the deliberate indifference standard, we held 
that regardless of an inmate's inability to pay, the 
government was obliged to provide medical services for 
those inmates in its custody. Id. at 350. In so holding, 
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however, we held that the government's additional 
obligation to pay for these services was contingent upon a 
lack of "alternative methods of funding." Id. at 351. We 
thus assumed that where an inmate could secure her own 
funding, it would not be unreasonable to make her pay her 
way. 
 
These cases demonstrate that both the Supreme Court 
and our Court anticipated cases where the state would be 
responsible for ensuring the provision of care, but might 
seek reimbursement from the party receiving the benefit of 
the care. We squarely faced that situation in Reynolds v. 
Wagner, 128 F.3d 166 (3d Cir. 1997), where prisoners were 
required to pay fees in order to obtain medical treatment. 
The program's purpose was to instill financial responsibility 
and to discourage abuse of sick call. Where a nurse or 
physician determined that sick call was warranted, 
however, the fee would be waived. Further, certain services, 
such as emergency care, psychiatric services, and other 
treatments were exempt from the fee requirement. 
 
The facts of that case are strikingly similar to the appeal 
presently before us. In Reynolds, no inmate was refused 
treatment because of a lack of funds. Instead, the 
prisoner's account was debited, and if the available funds 
were insufficient, a negative balance would be created. Half 
of all incoming funds could be used to satisfy the negative 
balance. Upon departure from the facility, the unpaid debt 
could be turned over to a collection agency. If the inmate 
was recommitted, the debt remained in full force. 
 
In that case, we rejected the argument that imposing a 
fee was per se unconstitutional. The plaintiffs were not 
denied medical care; further, "[i]f a prisoner is able to pay 
for medical care, requiring such payment is not deliberate 
indifference to serious medical needs." Id.  at 174 (internal 
quotes eliminated). In the outside world, the plaintiffs 
would have to pay for medical care. Id. Further, the 
proffered purposes -- teaching fiscal responsibility and 
deterring sick-call abuse -- were obviously reasonably 
related to legitimate penological interests. Id.  at 175. 
 
In light of the caselaw, we conclude that Tillman has not 
shown that he has been subjected to cruel and unusual 
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punishment. Undisputed evidence shows that the Cost 
Recovery Program is intended to teach fiscal responsibility 
to inmates. The plaintiff, who has since been released, is 
now expected by society to pay his own room and board. 
Teaching him such a skill while in prison amply satisfies 
Turner's requirement that the program be reasonably 
related to a legitimate penological interest. Turner, 482 U.S. 
at 89; James v. Quinlan, 866 F.2d 627, 630 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 
Regardless of Turner's applicability, we reach the same 
conclusion. Tillman's sentence was not extended, nor was 
he reincarcerated for failure to satisfy his debt. More 
importantly, he cannot show that basic human needs were 
left unsatisfied. He was never denied room, food, or other 
necessities, regardless of his failure to pay the fees. See 
Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 348 (double celling did not deprive 
prisoners of food, care, or sanitation, increase violence or 
create other intolerable conditions). This is simply not a 
case like Lanzaro, where necessary services were denied 
because a prisoner lacked the funds to pay. 
 
We note that Reynolds also considered and rejected an 
"as implemented" challenge to the disputed medical fees. 
We concluded there that such a challenge must fail 
because, inter alia, the "inmates have not pointed out 
evidence showing that they need this money for any vital 
expenses." Reynolds, 128 F.3d at 177. The plaintiff 's 
argument here suffers from the same shortcoming. He 
complains in the abstract that prisoners need funds to pay 
for "essentials like toiletries, stamps, extra blankets[,] etc." 
He does not, however, identify how the program caused him 
to be denied his own "basic human needs." Cf. City of 
Revere, 463 U.S. at 245 (so long as the necessary services 
are provided, "the Constitution does not dictate" the 
allocation of costs). 
 
Along these lines, we disagree with the Magistrate Judge 
that Reynolds is distinguishable because a prisoner might 
choose to forgo medical care, but cannot refuse to reside in 
an institution. The District Court correctly concluded that 
this distinction is without legal import. The fundamental 
question before us is whether basic human needs were 
denied to the plaintiff because of the defendants' deliberate 
indifference. In both Reynolds and the present case, the 
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defendants did not directly deny serious necessities to the 
prisoner plaintiffs; and in neither case did the plaintiffs 
present evidence to show that, due to the defendants' 
deliberate indifference, they were faced with a Hobson's 
choice between paying fees and purchasing necessities. 
Reynolds, 128 F.3d at 178. 
 
We also reject the plaintiff 's complaint that he is now 
burdened with post-incarceration debt. A similar argument 
was presented in Reynolds, where we noted that "[t]here is, 
of course, no general constitutional right to [be] free" of "a 
personal expense that [the plaintiff] can meet and would be 
required to meet in the outside world." Id.  at 173-74. If 
Tillman truly cannot meet his financial obligations, then his 
concerns would be more appropriately addressed in a 
federal bankruptcy court. That he is unhappy to be saddled 
with debt is understandable, but in the present 
circumstances, does not implicate the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause.8 
 
2. Excessive Fines 
 
By its plain language, the Excessive Fines Clause of the 
Eighth Amendment is violated only if the disputed fees are 
both "fines" and "excessive." See United States v. 
Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. 2028, 2033, 2036 (1998). 9 We 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The Magistrate Judge was concerned that the amount of debt 
accumulated raised a factual dispute as to whether a cruel and unusual 
punishment was shown. The only pertinent question in the present 
context, however, is whether the plaintiff 's basic human needs were met. 
Although a potentially insurmountable debt might implicate the Cruel 
and Unusual Punishments Clause in theory, we agree with the District 
Court that under these circumstances, the question of whether a debt is 
"grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime," Estelle, 429 U.S. 
at 103 n.7, is a matter more appropriately considered within the 
auspices of the Excessive Fines Clause, as discussed in the next 
subsection. 
 
9. The Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment, once virtually 
ignored, has been "rescued from obscurity" in recent years. Department 
of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 803 n.2 (1994) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). The text of the Eighth Amendment was directly 
based on Art. I, S 9 of the Virginia Declaration of Rights, which in turn 
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conclude that the Cost Recovery Program does not amount 
to an excessive fine. 
 
The term "fine" refers to punishment for a criminal 
offense. Browning-Ferris Industries of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco 
Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 265 (1989). The fees here, 
however, do not appear to fit that mold. A prisoner's term 
of incarceration cannot be extended, nor can he be 
reincarcerated, for failure to pay a negative balance. The 
daily fees do not vary with the gravity of the offense and 
can neither be increased nor waived. Rather than being 
used to punish, the undisputed evidence shows that the 
fees are designed to teach financial responsibility. More 
fundamentally, the fees can hardly be called fines when 
they merely represent partial reimbursement of the 
prisoner's daily cost of maintenance, something he or she 
would be expected to pay on the outside.10  
 
The District Court passed on the "fines" issue because of 
an apparent nagging concern over whether the payments 
are "in part, punitive." If the assessments and confiscations 
under the Cost Recovery Program "can only be explained as 
serving in part to punish," they are "punishment" for 
purposes of the Excessive Fines Clause, even if they may 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
was taken verbatim from the English Bill of Rights. Browning-Ferris 
Industries of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 266 (1989) 
(quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 285 n.10 (1983)). The Eighth 
Amendment received scant debate in the First Congress, and the 
Excessive Fines Clause received none. Id. at 294 (O'Connor, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). This is unsurprising because 
at least eight of the original States had a provision similar to the 
Excessive Fines Clause. Id. at 264 & n.5 (op. of the Court). 
 
10. In his pro se complaint, Tillman alleges that the county prison is 
reimbursed by the state for his costs of room and board, thus suggesting 
that the prison profited from the fees that he was charged. The 
defendants subsequently asserted in an affidavit that the county prison 
is not reimbursed for a state prisoner such as the plaintiff, who was 
reincarcerated for parole violations. The plaintiff has not submitted an 
affidavit or other evidentiary material to dispute the defendants' 
affidavit 
to the contrary. In this situation, an adverse party may not rest upon 
mere allegations in his pleadings, and any inconsistency does not give 
rise to a disputed question of material fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). 
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also be understood to serve remedial purposes. Austin v. 
United States, 509 U.S. 602, 610, 620-21 (1993). The Court 
also correctly noted, however, that the undisputed record 
indicates that the program was imposed for rehabilitative 
and not punitive purposes. 
 
We need not reach that issue. Even assuming that there 
is a factual question as to whether the Cost Recovery 
Program amounts to a fine, we hold that it is not excessive. 
Under the principle of "proportionality[, t]he amount of the 
forfeiture must bear some relationship to the gravity of the 
offense that it is designed to punish." Bajakajian, 118 S. 
Ct. at 2036. The plaintiff 's underlying offenses included a 
conviction for possession with intent to deliver 
approximately 29 grams of cocaine in violation of 35 P.S. 
S 780-113(a)(30), which allows for a fine not to exceed 
$100,000.00. Id. S 780-113(f)(1.1). 
 
Here, the plaintiff accumulated debt of roughly 
$4,000.00. It can hardly be said that a sum that is less 
than one-twentieth the legally permissible fine is"grossly 
disproportional to the gravity of a defendant's offense." 
Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. at 2036; see also Yskamp v. Drug 
Enforcement Admin., 163 F.3d 767, 773 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(forfeiture of property valued at over $500,000.00 in drug 
case not excessive). We will not speculate on the result we 
would reach where the offense was significantly less 
serious, or where the daily fees or total debt were 
significantly higher. Cf. Ilkanic, 705 So. 2d at 1372-73 
(rejecting due process and equal protection challenges to 
statute that provided for assessment of $50.00 per day for 
"damages and losses for incarceration costs and other 
correctional costs"). Under the circumstances presently 
before us, however, we conclude as a matter of law that the 
amounts were not "excessive" under the Eighth 
Amendment. 
 
B. Fourteenth Amendment 
 
1. Due Process 
 
Under procedural due process, the plaintiff 's interest 
must fall within the scope of "life, liberty, or property." 
Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466 (1983). The defendants 
 
                                15 
  
properly concede that the plaintiff has a property interest in 
his prison account, Reynolds, 128 F.3d at 179, but insist 
that he was provided with adequate procedural due 
process. We agree. 
 
In considering a due process claim, we look to the private 
interest, the governmental interest, and the value of the 
available procedure in safeguarding against an erroneous 
deprivation. Id.; see also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 
319, 335 (1976). Due process " `is flexible and calls for such 
procedural protections as the particular situation 
demands' " in order to "minimiz[e] the risk of error." 
Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and Corr. 
Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1979) (quoting Morrissey v. 
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)). "The amount of notice 
due depends on the context." Reynolds, 128 F.3d at 179 
(citing Gilbert v. Homar, 117 S. Ct. 1807, 1812 (1997)). 
 
In some cases, takings of property by the State require 
predeprivation notice and a hearing. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 
U.S. 527, 538 (1981), overruled on other gds. , Daniels v. 
Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986).11 But where the State must 
take quick action, or where it is impractical to provide 
meaningful predeprivation process, due process will be 
satisfied by a meaningful postdeprivation remedy. Id. at 
539. "In such cases, the normal predeprivation notice and 
opportunity to be heard is pretermitted if the State provides 
a postdeprivation remedy." Id. at 538."Parratt is not an 
exception to the Mathews balancing test, but rather an 
application of that test to the unusual case in which one of 
the variables in the Mathews equation -- the value of 
predeprivation safeguards -- is negligible in preventing the 
kind of deprivation at issue." Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 
113, 129 (1990).12 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. Daniels overruled Parratt only to the extent that the earlier case 
held 
that a mere lack of due care may deprive an individual of "life, liberty, 
or property under the Fourteenth Amendment." Daniels, 474 U.S. at 
330-31. 
 
12. We recognize that some cases hold that Parratt does not apply where 
an " `established state procedure' " destroys an entitlement without 
proper procedural safeguards. See, e.g. , Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 
455 U.S. 422, 436 (1982) (quoting Parratt, 451 U.S. at 541); Brown v. 
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It is impractical to expect the prison to provide 
predeprivation proceedings under these circumstances. As 
the takings and assessments pass substantive 
constitutional muster,13 we only need ask whether the 
attendant procedure is also constitutionally adequate. It is. 
The assessments and takings pursuant to the program 
involve routine matters of accounting, with a low risk of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Trench, 787 F.2d 167, 171 (3d Cir. 1986). In such a case, a 
predeprivation hearing is still required. Brown , 787 F.2d at 171. 
However, the Supreme Court has since noted in an ex parte forfeiture 
case, i.e., one that involves established state procedures, that in 
"extraordinary situations," predeprivation notice and hearings are 
unnecessary. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 
43, 53 (1993). The case before us presents such an"extraordinary 
situation." As we held in Reynolds, "a prison must have the ability to 
deduct fees from an inmate's account even when the inmate refuses to 
grant authorization." Reynolds, 128 F.3d at 180. Thus, if the available 
postdeprivation procedure is adequate, then that is all the process to 
which the plaintiff is due under these circumstances. 
 
13. As noted in the previous section, the Cost Recovery Program does not 
violate the Eighth Amendment. Also, we do not see a substantive due 
process violation. Substantive due process rights"are at least as great as 
the Eighth Amendment protections available to a convicted prisoner." 
City of Revere, 463 U.S. at 244. We need only note that we have 
considered and rejected the plaintiff 's Eighth Amendment arguments. 
Further, we considered a substantive due process claim arising under 
almost identical circumstances in Reynolds, 128 F.3d at 182, and see no 
need to find differently here. 
 
We acknowledge that in United States v. Spiropoulos, 976 F.2d 155 (3d 
Cir. 1992), we held that former U.S.S.G. S 5E1.2(i) violated the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 169. That Guideline 
required sentencing judges to order defendants to pay the costs of their 
imprisonment. Our decision in Spiropoulos, however, was premised on a 
lack of authority in the Sentencing Reform Act to assess fines to recoup 
the costs of incarceration. Id. at 165. Further, the funds collected under 
U.S.S.G. S 5E1.2(i) were not put towards prison costs, but instead placed 
into the Crime Victims Fund. The present case differs materially from 
Spiropoulos. Authorization for the Cost Recovery Program was specifically 
granted by the Lebanon County Prison Board. In addition, any funds 
raised under the Cost Recovery Program are put into the county's 
general fund, which in turn finances the county prison. In sum, any 
substantive theories proffered by the plaintiff fail. 
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error. To the extent that mistakes such as erroneous 
assessments or incorrect takings might occur, they may be 
corrected through the prison's grievance program without 
any undue burden on a prisoners' rights. On the other 
hand, to require predeprivation proceedings for what are 
essentially ministerial matters would significantly increase 
transaction costs and essentially frustrate an important 
purpose of the program, which is to reduce the county's 
costs of incarcerating prisoners. 
 
The plaintiff had adequate notice of the grievance 
program and of the Cost Recovery Program. Upon 
confinement in January of 1997, notice of the Cost 
Recovery Program and a copy of it were still posted in the 
plaintiff 's cell block. Also, Tillman was given a handbook, 
which described the prison grievance procedure. When the 
handbook was updated to include the Cost Recovery 
Program and an expanded grievance procedure, the plaintiff 
was given a copy of that as well. He was given an additional 
copy of the handbook upon reconfinement in October of 
1997. The grievance program allowed prisoners to complain 
about "any" matter that is "unjust," and as updated, also 
provided for direct appeal to the warden. 
 
In sum, the plaintiff had an adequate postdeprivation 
remedy in the grievance program. In Reynolds, we held that 
the existence of a similar grievance program provided a 
sufficient remedy. 128 F.3d at 181. In sum, the plaintiff 
had an adequate postdeprivation remedy, thereby satisfying 
due process.14 
 
We also note that there is no due process violation in the 
fact that the plaintiff 's account was turned over for 
collection. He could have avoided this turn of events by 
making payments as low as $5.00 a week on his debt. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. The plaintiff does not argue that advance notice of the program was 
required. In any case, because an adequate postdeprivation remedy 
exists, no advance notice was necessary. Even if advance notice were 
necessary, it was satisfied under the facts of this case. The plaintiff 's 
property right in his inmate account did not vest until he was 
incarcerated for parole violations. At that time, he was given notice of 
the 
existence of the program and the grievance procedure. Due process does 
not require more. 
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The plaintiff also complains that the prison lacked 
authority to implement the Cost Recovery Program, but we 
find no problem in that arena as well. Although we have 
not uncovered a statute explicitly providing for the 
deductions at issue here, the Cost Recovery Program was 
duly promulgated, not by the state, but by the county 
prison board, which has "exclusive[ ]" authority regarding 
"the government and management" of the facility. 61 P.S. 
S 408(a)(1).15 Other courts have not seen barriers to the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. Because Lebanon County is a county of thefifth class, its prison 
board is "exclusively vested" with "the safe-keeping, discipline, and 
employment of prisoners, and the government and management of said 
institution." 61 P.S. S 408(a)(1). The board "shall make such rules and 
regulations . . . as may be deemed necessary." Id. S 409. Thus, the 
prison board indeed has the authority to promulgate the Cost Recovery 
Program. 
 
Our conclusion is unchanged by 61 P.S. S 410, which states that "all 
the expenditures required for the support and maintenance of prisoners, 
the repairs and improvement of said prison, shall be paid from the 
county treasury by warrants drawn, in the mode now prescribed by law, 
on the regular appropriation for the purpose." Wefirst note that any 
funds obtained through the Cost Recovery Program are placed into the 
county's general fund, out of which all prison expenses -- including 
prisoner maintenance -- are duly paid in accordance with section 410. 
Thus, the Cost Recovery Program is not in violation of this statute. 
 
But we need not rest our conclusion on the mere mechanics of 
accounting. Reading section 410 as a whole makes it clear that its focus 
is on the proper procedures for payments, accounting, and contracting. 
See id. ("no warrant shall be certified by the controller for any expense 
connected with the prison unless on vouchers approved by a majority of 
said board and endorsed by the president and secretary thereof, and all 
contracts involving an expenditure of funds from the county treasury 
shall be made in accordance with [the law]"). 
 
More fundamentally, section 410 is utterly silent regarding the 
permissible sources of funds that go into the treasury. We do not read 
this silence to support the plaintiff 's argument. Rather, section 410 
simply requires that creditors be paid in the first instance by the 
county. 
In no way does it prohibit the recovery of costs from those who receive 
the benefits of those expenditures. To conclude otherwise would be 
contrary to Reynolds, where we upheld similar prisoner assessments. In 
sum, because sections 408 and 409 expressly grant broad and exclusive 
authority to the prison board, we reject the plaintiff 's suggestion that 
the board lacked the authority to promulgate the Cost Recovery Program. 
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promulgation of such programs by prisons and prison 
officials, and neither do we. See Reynolds, 128 F.3d at 170, 
183 (upholding program that was created by county 
prison); Mastrian, 725 F.2d at 1165-66 (upholding 
programs instituted by correctional officials). 
 
2. Equal Protection 
 
Nor do the facts show a violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause. Under that provision, persons who are similarly 
situated should be treated in the same manner. City of 
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 
(1985). Because the distinctions at issue here do not 
implicate a suspect or quasi-suspect class, the state action 
here is presumed to be valid and will be upheld if it is 
"rationally related to a legitimate state interest." Id. at 440- 
42. The defendants maintain that the program is designed 
to teach fiscal responsibility to inmates. Another 
conceivable purpose is to reimburse the state for the 
expenses of incarceration. Malmed v. Thornburgh , 621 F.2d 
565, 569 (3d Cir. 1980) (state action may be upheld on any 
valid ground, even one hypothetically posed by the court). 
 
Both interests are legitimate and the plaintiff does not 
present an argument to the contrary. Further, the purposes 
of teaching fiscal responsibility and partially recouping the 
costs of incarceration are surely rationally related to 
requiring inmates to pay for their share of maintenance. 
The plaintiff would have to make similar expenditures on 
the outside, and making him do so under the Cost Recovery 
Program teaches him to assume real-world responsibilities. 
 
We also note that although "trusty" inmates are not 
charged for room and board, they "pay" their housing costs 
by providing labor to the prison. Similarly, work release 
inmates pay at least $70.00 per week to the prison, and 
therefore do not pay any less than those prisoners in the 
Cost Recovery Program. Where there is no discrimination, 
there is no equal protection violation. Mastrian , 725 F.2d at 
1166. 
 
The plaintiff also complains that inmate Anthony Ashford 
was not charged any fees. Undisputed evidence shows that 
Ashford had been removed from the Work Release Program, 
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and prison authorities mistakenly failed to begin charging 
him fees under the Cost Recovery Program. Upon being 
alerted to this oversight, Ashford's account was back- 
charged for all the relevant fees. As such, the plaintiff 
cannot point to any discrimination, and therefore to any 
equal protection violation. 
 
III. Conclusion 
 
The judgment of the District Court will be affirmed. 
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RENDELL, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting 
in part: 
 
In his pro se complaint, Tillman, a state prisoner, alleges 
that the Lebanon County prison took half of the money in 
his wallet, as well as half of the money orders sent to him, 
to pay the balance of a daily $10 charge incurred during an 
earlier prison sentence. The prison took this money 
pursuant to a policy adopted by the Lebanon County Prison 
Board. Tillman states, "I sign [sic] no agreement or 
contracts to have them take my money." His counseled 
brief on appeal similarly attacks the prison's basis for 
taking his money, stating that "no court, nor any statute, 
authorizes the imposition of the arbitrary costs forced on 
appellant against his will." Brief for Appellant at 6. 
According to the affidavit of the former Chairman of the 
Lebanon County Prison Board, the Prison Board adopted 
the Cost Recovery Program "as a rehabilitative measure, 
designed to teach sentenced inmates financial 
responsibility, by requiring them to contribute to the 
expenses necessary to house, feed, clothe and protect them 
while incarcerated." App. 92. 
 
The majority concludes that the prison's internal 
grievance procedure provides prisoners with the post- 
deprivation opportunity for a hearing that due process 
requires. I agree with the majority's holding, as far as it 
goes. However, I do not think we have addressed the more 
fundamental substantive due process question raised by 
Tillman's allegations, namely, what enables the Lebanon 
County Prison Board to impose this consequence upon a 
person convicted of a state crime? Can it, on its own, 
decide to deprive state prisoners unfortunate enough to be 
housed there of $10 per day, to be paid to the county's 
coffers, under the guise of rehabilitating them and teaching 
them financial responsibility? Although the imposition of 
this compensation scheme is obviously not the same as 
restitution, it strikes me as a similar type of sentencing 
consequence that should emanate from the state in the first 
instance.1 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. In Pennsylvania, "an order of restitution must be based on statutory 
authority." In the Interest of M.W., 725 A.2d 729, 731 (Pa. 1999) (citing 
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As the majority notes, other states have passed 
legislation authorizing prisons to take inmates' funds in 
situations such as this. Interestingly, the Pennsylvania 
legislature has chosen to authorize county prisons to collect 
a reasonable amount from prisoners, but the statute 
applies only to those incarcerated "on weekends or other 
short periods each week."2 I submit that the record and 
briefs do not explore this issue adequately. I suggest, 
further, that the majority's reasoning, contained in a 
footnote, that a state law establishing boards of inspectors 
to oversee prison operations provides the requisite authority 
to impose this charge as a consequence of incarceration is 
less than persuasive. I also do not believe that the case law 
cited by the majority provides a satisfactory paradigm for 
this type of mandatory charge.3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Commonwealth v. Harner, 617 A.2d 702, 704 (Pa. 1992) ("It is generally 
agreed that restitution is a creature of statute and, without express 
legislative direction, a court is powerless to direct a defendant to make 
restitution as part of a sentence.")). In the federal context, we recently 
reiterated the "firmly established principle that federal courts may not 
order restitution in the absence of statutory authorization." United 
States 
v. Akande, 200 F.3d 136, 138 (3d Cir. 1999). If the rehabilitative 
measure Tillman challenges is not a punitive one, what is its precise 
character? 
 
2. Section 2146, "Collection from weekend prisoners," provides as 
follows: 
 
       The county prison board, or where applicable the county 
       commissioners, may, by resolution which shall establish rates and 
       qualifications, authorize the warden, sheriff or other person in 
       charge of the jail to collect a reasonable amount from prisoners 
       incarcerated only on weekends or other short periods each week. 
 
Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 61 S 2146 (West 1999). See Commonwealth v. 
Cassell, 12 Pa. D. & C. 4th 265 (York County 1991) (concluding that 
section 2146 authorized short-term fee to be imposed upon defendant, 
who had requested deferment of mandatory minimum 48-hour prison 
sentence). 
 
3. The precise question at issue in this appeal was raised in neither 
Reynolds v. Wagner, 128 F.3d 166 (3d Cir. 1997), nor Mastrian v. 
Schoen, 725 F.2d 1164 (8th Cir. 1984) (affirming grant of summary 
judgment in favor of state correction officials on a complaint alleging an 
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Tillman has presented a fundamental question, and I 
would reverse and remand for further development of this 
issue. 
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equal protection violation stemming from a now-discontinued 
experimental program to charge room and board based on inmates' 
levels of income in a state prison). In Reynolds , we characterized the 
fee 
at issue as to be paid in consideration for beneficial medical services, 
Reynolds, 128 F.3d at 180, and it is clear from the exceptions to the fee 
requirement (e.g., initial intake, emergency, psychiatric services, 
chronic 
illness screening) that choice was involved to avail oneself of medical 
services for which a fee was charged, which is not the case here. 
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